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Abstract
Using a large data set on web browsing and purchasing behavior we test to what extent
consumers are searching in accordance to various classical search models. We find that the
benchmark model of sequential search with a known distributions of prices can be rejected
based on the recall patterns we observe in the data. Moreover, we show that even if consumers
are initially unaware of the price distribution and have to learn the price distribution, observed
search behavior for given consumers over time is more consistent with non-sequential search
than sequential search with learning. Our findings suggest non-sequential search provides a more
accurate description of observed consumer search behavior. We then utilize the non-sequential
search model to estimate the price elasticities and markups of online book retailers.
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1 Introduction
Since Stigler’s (1961) seminal paper, models of costly search have been at the heart of many
economic models trying to explain imperfectly competitive behavior in product and labor markets.
The theoretical literature typically models consumer search in two ways: following Stigler’s original
model, a strand of literature assumes non-sequential search behavior, where consumers sample a
fixed number of stores, and choose to buy the lowest price alternative.1 A much larger strand of the
literature, starting with McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970), points out that consumers cannot
commit to a non-sequential search strategy in instances where the expected marginal benefit of an
extra search exceeds the marginal cost. Thus, this literature argues that a sequential search model
provides a better description of actual consumer search.2
Unfortunately, beyond the a priori reasons put forth by the literature, there have been few
empirical studies of whether actual consumers follow sequential or non-sequential strategies. This
is, no doubt, due to the difficulty of collecting data on individual search behavior. Therefore, most of
what we know about individual level search behavior is from laboratory experiments. The majority
of the experimental literature on search has focused on sequential search.3 Schotter and Braunstein
(1981) have reported that on average subjects tend to search in a fashion that is consistent with
sequential search strategies, although subjects tend to search too little to be searching optimally.
Kogut (1990) and Sonnemans (1998) find evidence that individuals are making decisions based
on the total return from searching instead of on the marginal return from another draw as they
would do if searching sequentially, resulting in too little search. Moreover, Kogut (1990) finds
that in about a third of the time individuals accepted old offers, which violates optimal policy.
Zwick et al. (2003) also find large rates of recall among participants of an experiment in which
a randomly selected object with a known rank order has to be selected. Harrison and Morgan
(1990) directly compare non-sequential and sequential strategies to so-called variable-sample-size
strategies. The latter strategy is described in Morgan and Manning (1985) and is a generalization
of both non-sequential and sequential search since it allows individuals to choose both sample size
and how many times to search. Harrison and Morgan (1990) report that experimental subjects
1See also Burdett and Judd (1983) and Janssen and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2004).
2Examples of sequential search models in the consumer search literature are Axell (1977), Reinganum (1979),
Carlson and McAfee (1983), Rob (1985), and Stahl (1989).
3See Camerer (1995, pp. 670-73) for a review of this literature.
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indeed employ the least restrictive strategy if they are allowed to do so.
Aside from experimental studies, Hong and Shum (2006) and Chen, Hong, and Shum (2007)
are the only papers that we are aware of that have attempted to discriminate between sequential
and non-sequential search models using data from a real-world market. Hong and Shum (2006)
collect data on textbook prices, and estimate structural parameters of search cost distributions
(i.e. the demand parameters) that rationalize the prices set by competing firms. They find larger
search-cost magnitudes for the parametrically estimated sequential search model than for the non-
parametrically estimated non-sequential search model. Similar data is used in Chen, Hong, and
Shum (2007) to conduct a nonparametric likelihood ratio test for choosing among the nonpara-
metrically, moment-based non-sequential and parametrically estimated sequential search models.
Although certain parameterizations of the sequential search model are found to be inferior, they
conclude that it is difficult to distinguish between the non-sequential search model and the log-
normal parameterization of the sequential search model in terms of fit.
This paper utilizes novel data on the web browsing and purchasing behavior of a large panel
of consumers to test classical models of consumer search. Our data, described in some detail in
Section 2, allows us to observe the online stores visited while shopping for a particular item, and
which store the consumer decided to buy from. As pointed out by Kogut (1990) and as we will
argue in more detail in Section 3 below, under the reservation price (utility) rule prescribed by the
“benchmark” model of sequential search, a consumer always buys from the last store she visited,
unless she has visited all stores in her choice set. In Section 4, using data on consumers shopping
for books online, we find that this prediction is rejected by a large number of consumers in our
data set.
In Section 3, we discuss the Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981) model, which relaxes the assumption
that consumers “know” the distribution of prices while deciding on their search strategy, and allow
for learning of the price distribution. Importantly, in this setting, the sequential search model can
not be rejected based on recall patterns alone. Instead, we derive bounds on search costs that
rationalize observed search behavior, and conduct tests based on the consistency of these search
cost bounds across shopping trips. In Section 5, we explore whether misspecification of the search
model is quantitatively important in our particular setting. In particular, we estimate consumer
search cost distributions (the demand parameters) under various search rules. We find that the
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estimated search costs under the non-sequential search assumption display much less dispersion
within person than the search costs estimated under the sequential search with Bayesian learning
model. This means the non-sequential search model leads to more stable parameter estimates, and
we thus conclude that non-sequential search may provide a more accurate description of observed
behavior.
Finally, in Section 7 we use the favored non-sequential search model to estimate the price
elasticities faced by online retailers, and, under static profit maximization, the markups charged
by these retailers. To do this, Section 6 derives expressions for demand elasticities implied by the
non-sequential search model. One important feature of this model is that we allow for asymmetric
sampling : due to for instance advertising or prior shopping experience, consumers’ first draw may
be skewed towards some online retailers (e.g. Amazon) over others.
Our results, reported in Section 7, indicate higher price elasticities than reported by Chevalier
and Goolsbee (2003), especially for Amazon. A further discussion of our results vis a vis prior
findings is in Section 7.1.
2 Data
We construct the dataset using two sources of data. The main data comes from the ComScore Web-
Behavior Panel and includes detailed online browsing and transaction data from 100,000 Internet
users for 2002 and 52,028 users for 2004. The users were chosen at random by ComScore from a
universe of 1.5 million global users. ComScore is a leading provider of information on consumers’
online behavior and supplies Fortune 500 companies and large news organizations with market
research on e-commerce sales trends, website traffic, and online advertising campaigns. Each user’s
online activity is channeled through ComScore proxy servers that record all Internet traffic, includ-
ing information on visits to a website or domain (browsing), as well as secure online transactions.
The data include date, time, and duration of visit, as well as price, quantity, and description of
each product purchased during the session.
We find that individuals in the ComScore sample are representative of online buyers in the
United States. Comparing Internet users that have bought a product online on the sample with the
Internet and Computer Use Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Forrester
Technographics Survey, we find that the samples are similar in terms of the age, education, income,
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household composition and other observable characteristics. The main differences of the ComScore
sample, is that Internet users are older, with higher income, and more likely to be in college
(those with “some college but no degree”) than the CPS sample. The racial composition is similar
across samples—online users are predominantly white. However, compared with CPS, ComScore
oversamples Hispanics and Forrester oversamples whites. The geographic distribution of users is
similar to CPS population estimates at the regional and state levels. Using the ComScore sample,
we find that book buyers, those who purchased at least one book online, are slightly older, with
greater income and more education than those who had any online transaction. We refer to De los
Santos (2008) for a more detailed description of the sample.
The dataset contains users’ transactions for products and services from June 2002 to December
2002 and for the full year of 2004. We excluded observations from firms that could not be identi-
fied as online bookstores, such as unidentified domains and auction sites. In total, 18 percent of
the transactions were excluded; most of these were from Ebay.com (15 percent of transactions).
Although the excluded transactions represent a large number of observations, they cannot be con-
sidered sales from an online bookstore because they are auctions of potentially different books, for
example used books, autographed volumes, or auctioned items. A small number of transactions
from international Amazon websites (in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Denmark) were also
dropped. Given that Borders transaction were handled by Amazon in 2002 and 2004, we excluded
browsing activity from Borders.com to avoid double counting.4 Approximately 38 percent of the
users realized a product transaction in 2002 (48 percent of users in 2004), and 7 percent of users
bought at least one book online in 2002 (10 percent in 2004). This results in transactions from 15
online bookstores with 7,558 observations in 2002 and 8,020 observations in 2004.5
In order to analyze consumer search of online bookstores, we grouped small bookstores into two
categories to create four firms: Amazon (66 percent of transactions), Barnes and Noble (20 percent),
Book clubs (11 percent), and Other bookstores (4 percent). “Book clubs” include the following sites
(.com): Christianbook, Doubledaybookclub, Eharlequin, Literaryguild, and Mysteryguild. Other
bookstores include (.com): 1bookstreet, Allbooks4less, Alldirect, Booksamillion, Ecampus, Powells,
4Although initially Borders operated Borders.com, in April 2001 it signed a commercial agreement giving Amazon
control of customer service, fulfillment, and inventory operations. As a result all visits to Borders.com are redirected
to Amazon.com. In 2008 Borders relaunched Borders.com as an independent online bookstore.
5Each observation represents a single book purchased during one transaction; if multiple copies of the book are
purchased in the same transaction, it is recorded as one observation.
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Varsitybooks, and Walmart. Table 1 displays the number of transactions and visits per bookstore
for the firm groups.
Transactions Visits
Bookstore Number % Number %
Amazon 10,206 65.5% 249,593 76.3%
Barnes and Noble 3,046 19.6% 25,758 7.9%
Book Clubs
christianbook.com 615 3.9% 3968 1.2%
doubledaybookclub.com 468 3.0% 4001 1.2%
eharlequin.com 61 0.4% 3647 1.1%
literaryguild.com 326 2.1% 3500 1.1%
mysteryguild.com 188 1.2% 2095 0.6%
Other Bookstore
1bookstreet.com 10 0.1% 120 0.0%
allbooks4less.com 5 0.0% 199 0.1%
alldirect.com 27 0.2% 490 0.1%
ecampus.com 114 0.7% 1206 0.4%
powells.com 68 0.4% 1326 0.4%
varsitybooks.com 16 0.1% 218 0.1%
walmart.com 183 1.2% 28663 8.8%
booksamillion.com 245 1.6% 2290 0.7%
Total 15,578 100.0% 327,074 100.0%
Table 1: Transactions and Visits by Bookstore
The browsing activity of all users consists of 112,361 visits to the websites of online bookstores
in 2002 and 214,713 visits in 2004.6 In order to identify a user’s visit to a website as search behavior
related to a particular transaction, we link the browsing history up to 7 days before a transaction.
There is no evidence to guide the definition of a search time span in relation to a transaction. One
week is long enough to capture all search behavior related to a transaction; any longer intervals are
likely to also capture unrelated website visits. A search history could be less than 7 days if another
transaction has occurred within 7 days. Limiting browsing to search occurring 7 days prior to a
purchase reduces the sample to 18,349 observations in 2002 and 25,513 in 2004. Although some
user search may not be linked to the next transaction, but to a subsequent one, there is no clear
way to link this intervening search to a later transaction. For example, if a user searches prices
for book A but buys book B first, the search for book A is linked to book B. In the case where
multiple books are acquired in the same transaction, browsing is linked to all books purchased. In
the results we use several definitions of the relevant search period, from 7 days to the same day of
6This large increase was the result of a more than twofold increase in the number of visits to Amazon, which is
the largest online bookstore and had 80 percent of website visits in 2004.
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the transaction. Table 6 gives descriptive statistics of the sample.
2002 2004
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Duration of each website visit (in minutes)
Visits not within 7 days of transaction 8.89 13.03 7.69 12.36
Visits within 7 days, excluding transactions 12.21 15.55 10.72 14.84
Visits within 7 days, excluding transactions 19.04 18.26 15.74 17.37
Transactions only 27.90 17.69 25.93 17.68
Total duration, excluding transaction visits 32.47 49.80 38.41 78.33
Total duration, including transaction visits 43.77 43.72 47.68 65.99
Number of firms searched 1.27 0.54 1.30 0.56
Number of books per transaction 2.38 2.10 2.20 1.95
Transaction expenditures (books only) 36.70 40.67 32.21 35.68
Number of books purchased 17,956 17,631
Number of transaction sessions 7,559 8,002
Number of visits within 7 days 18,349 25,513
Number of visits not within 7 days 94,012 189,200
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of ComScore Book Sample
Despite the relative large number of online bookstores in 2002 and 2004, the market is highly
concentrated, with the two dominant firms capturing 83 percent of the market: Amazon (66 percent
of book sales) and Barnes and Noble (17 percent).7 Amazon was visited in 74 percent book
transactions, and in only 17 percent of transactions did Amazon buyers browse any other bookstore.
Also, this firms capture most of the searching activity online. Of the 234 online bookstores listed
on the Yahoo directory, the 15 bookstores in the sample captures 98.4 percent of all consumer visits
to an online bookstores. The dominance of Amazon and Barnes and Noble in the market might
explain the low levels of consumer search: users on average searched 1.2 bookstores in 2002 and 1.3
in 2004 (De los Santos, 2008).
Given the large number of online bookstores relative to the low number bookstores actually
visited, we need to define which bookstores are relevant in the consumer search process as consumers
might not be aware of all the online bookstores in the market. We construct consumers awareness
of different bookstores by analyzing the consumer’s browsing history within the dataset. For each
transaction, a consumer is aware of a given bookstore if she has previously visited the bookstores.
For a given search sequence the number of bookstores N is defined as the number of bookstores a
consumer is aware at the time of the transaction. Figure 1 displays the distribution of consumer
bookstore awareness.
7Books sales in dollars for 2004 from the ComScore data sample.
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Note: The graphs the distribution of the number of bookstores known to the consumer. For each transaction, a consmer is aware of a given bookstore if she
has previously visited the bookstores. For a given search sequence the number of bookstores, is defined as the number of bookstores a consumer is aware
at the time of the transaction.
Figure 1: Consumer Bookstore Awareness
A limitation of the ComScore data is although we observe consumers visits to different retailer,
we only observe the price of the transaction. We use two methods to recover missing prices for
those visited bookstores. First, we use the most recent transaction prices at those bookstores with
missing values. Second, we merged the book price information from a price comparison website to
recover the distribution of prices.
This second data set contains more detailed information on prices and availability across stores
for selected titles and is constructed using data from mySimon.com, a popular price comparison
website.8 By scouring thousands of web sites the search system of mySimon.com lists Internet stores
in categories like computers, books, electronics, apparel, music, and movies. Each product listed
on mySimon.com has a unique web page that gives the prices of online stores selling the item, as
well as information on availability, store ratings, shipping costs, and sales taxes. We automatically
collected this data for fourty-two book titles in the period between August and September 2004
using a web spider written in Java. The data set contains reference books, textbooks, as well (non-
)fiction paperback and hardcover books. Although we only have information for a limited number
of titles, a substantial share of the (non-)fiction book titles in our data set appeared on several of
8See http://www.mysimon.com.
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The New York Times Best Sellers Lists during 2004.
In total fourteen different bookstores have posted prices on mySimon.com during the sampling
period for at least on of the book titles.9 Table 3 gives some summary statistics for the data.
NYT bestseller NYT bestseller NYT bestseller Random Reference Textbooks
fiction fiction non-fiction books books
(hardcover) (paperback)
Number of observations 2056 1542 1145 1818 335 554
Number of book titles 12 9 5 8 4 4
Number of stores 12.8 12.4 12.7 11.4 4.6 6.9
Unit price 13.94 7.73 13.50 10.67 225.31 68.69
Difference between max and min 6.20 5.38 5.52 6.20 34.18 15.12
Standard deviation 1.89 1.61 1.47 1.9 13.38 5.40
Coefficient of variation 13.76% 20.96% 10.73% 15.15% 5.2% 8.3%
Difference price BN and Amazon 0.69 0.25 1.27 2.04 - -
% of obs. BN and Amazon equal 55% 54% 40% 28% - -
% of obs. BN more expensive 31% 41% 41% 64% - -
% of obs. Amazon more expensive 14% 6% 19% 7% - -
Notes: Barnesandnoble.com (BN) did not post any prices of the textbooks and reference books in our sample on mySi-
mon.com during the sampling period.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
We use price data from both ComScore and mySimon.com to estimate the bounds of the price
distribution, p, p. The prices from ComScore were the minimum and maximum transaction prices
for a given product within the entire span of the dataset. MySimon tracks about 40 books during
August and September of 2004 (8 books were not bought in the entire ComScore data), we use the
minimum and maximum prices for this period. Since mySimon provides stocking information, we
discard prices were the prices was not in stock, back-order, pre-order and other, or if it was flagged
as refurbished.
3 Empirical Implications of Search Models
Consider first the classic sequential search model of McCall (1970), in where a consumer is sampling
stores selling a homogenous good. Assuming the consumer believes that each store’s price is an
i.i.d. draw from distribution F (p) (which may arise as the result of a symmetric mixed strategy
pricing equilibrium), the consumer will continue to search as long as she finds a price greater than
9We exclude Amazon Marketplace, which is reported by mySimon in some instances, since the prices were likely
be from used books, for 80 percent of the books marketplace was the lowest price of the bookstores for prices such
as 1 cents to a dollar.
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some reservation price r(c), where r(c) is given by:
c =
∫ r(c)
p
(r(c)− p)f(p) dp. (1)
As seen in the equation, the reservation price is such that, if the price in hand is r(c), the marginal
cost of search c equals the expected benefit from continuing searching. (The integral on the right-
hand side is the expected reduction in price from another search, accounting for the option value
of discarding higher price draws.)
Since for a consumer with search cost c the reservation price r(c) is constant across searches,
the consumer will never recall a price that she sampled earlier, unless there are a finite number of
stores, and the consumer has visited all the stores. Our first test of the sequential search hypothesis
will thus focus on recall behavior by consumers.
Test 1 (No Recall) Under the null hypothesis of the McCall model, we should not observe recall
of already sampled alternatives, unless the consumers has exhausted sampling all of the stores whose
existence she is aware of.
Note that the above test would apply if consumers were considering attributes other than price,
i.e. we could have rewritten the model in which firms were offering a distribution F (u) of net
utilities, and the stopping rule would have been couched in terms of a reservation utility level.
Moreover, the test allows for unequal sampling probabilities across firms.
Observe that the absence of recall in the model described above depends crucially on the con-
stant reservation price rule. We now discuss a variant of the sequential search model that may lead
to a sequence of reservation prices that are increasing in the number of prices sampled. This is
the model of Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981), in which consumers learn about the price distribution
while sampling. More specifically, we assume searchers learn by Bayesian updating their Dirichlet
priors over prices that follow a multinomial distribution.10
In particular, suppose a random vector of prices p = (p1, . . . , pn) follows a multinomial distribu-
tion with probabilities of each price pi = (pi1, . . . , pik). The vector pi containing the true probabilities
of each price being charged is unknown, but its prior distribution is assumed to be Dirichlet with
10Since the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution the posterior distribution
will be Dirichlet as well. This means this combination of distribution and prior is relatively easy to work with and
allows us to retrieve simple expressions.
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parameters α = (N1, . . . , Nn), where αi can be interpreted as the frequency of price pi, i.e., Ni/N ,
where N =
∑
Ni. Then the posterior distribution of pi after observing a price pi is a Dirichlet
distribution with parameters α∗ = α + ei, where ei is a vector that contains 1 on the ith place
and 0 everywhere else.11 For instance, suppose consumers have an uninformative uniform Dirichlet
prior distribution, i.e., α = (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1). If a consumer observes a price p2 we simply add 1 to
α2 to get a Dirichlet posterior distribution with parameters α∗ = (1, 2, 1, . . . , 1). Note that the
impact of an additional price observations on the posterior is decreasing in N , which means we can
interpret N as an indicator of how certain searchers are about their prior.
As shown by Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981) in the above setting consumers’ optimal search policy
is myopic and can be characterized by a reservation price that is non-decreasing in the number of
prices sampled. This means that unlike the standard sequential search model a sequential search
model with Bayesian updating can in fact explain why some consumer return to previously visited
stores, even if they have not exhausted all their search possibilities.
An attractive feature of the model is that the gains from searching only depend on how sure
consumers are about their prior and on the lowest observed price so far. Moreover, if a consumer
returns to a previously visited store to buy the good, that is, the consumer recalls, the range of
search costs that rationalizes this behavior is relatively small. To see this, suppose there are N
possible prices p: p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pN . For simplicity, assume the consumer’s prior after having
observed some initial price pk is uninformative, i.e., Ni = 1. The gains from search G(·) at the
lowest observed price so far, denoted p∗N , are then
G(p∗N = pk|p) = pk −
(
k−1∑
i=1
1
N
· pi + N − (k − 1)
N
· pk
)
=
k
N
· pk −
k∑
i=1
1
N
· pi.
Intuitively, the gain is equal to the price at hand minus the expected price when searching, using
that a consumer will stick to the current price in the unfortunate event a higher price than pk is
sampled. After having observed a second price the searcher will update her prior. We are interested
in recall patterns, so suppose this second price is higher than p∗N . Since the gains of search only
depend on the probability of finding a price lower than p∗N , when the second price is higher than
11See Theorem 1 on p.174 of DeGroot (1970).
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p∗N the gains from search will only be affected through the change in N :
G(p∗N+1 = pk|p) = pk −
(
k−1∑
i=1
1
N + 1
· pi + N + 1− (k − 1)
N + 1
· pk
)
=
k
N + 1
· pk −
k∑
i=1
1
N + 1
· pi
=
N
N + 1
G(p∗N = pk|p).
Therefore, if we observe a consumer searching once more, but returning to the store visited before
the additional search to buy the good, we know her search cost should have been:
N
N + 1
G(p∗N |p) < c < G(p∗N |p). (2)
To illustrate what this implies for the setting we are studying, suppose we observe a consumer
searching online for a particular book. The consumer is first going to Amazon, then to Barnes and
Noble, but finally buys the book at Amazon for a price of $7. To be able to calculate the search
cost that rationalizes the observed behavior, given the above search protocol, we need to make an
assumption about the support of the prior as well as how much weight the searcher puts on her
prior, which is captured by N . For the latter we take the number of online stores selling books the
consumer is aware of, while we use the observed support of the empirical price distribution for the
book to approximate the support of the consumer’s prior. Suppose this support is [p, p] = [6, 12],
the consumer has observed an initial price p∗N = 7 at Amazon, and suppose the consumer is aware
of 5 bookstores, so we set N = 5. Assuming the consumer’s prior distribution after having visited
Amazon is uniform the gains from searching are
G(p∗N = 7) = p
∗
N −
(
p∗N − p
p− p ·
p∗N + p
2
+
p− p∗N
p− p · p
∗
N
)
;
= 7−
(
1
6
· 61
2
+
5
6
· 7
)
= 0.08,
which is just the price at hand minus the expected price when searching, assuming a continuous
uniform distribution. Using equation (2) and the weight put on the prior, we know the search cost
c of this consumer should have been c ∈ (0.07, 0.08). Note we only need the bounds of the price
distribution and the transaction price for this calculation, and not the price at Barnes and Noble.
As illustrated in the example above, to rationalize recall behavior for searchers searching sequen-
tially with Bayesian updating requires very specific search cost values. This means if we observe
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consumers recalling, given the support of the price distribution and weight put on the prior, we
can be pretty specific in what their search cost should have been. As discussed in more detail in
Section 5, this will be used to test whether sequential search with learning can explain the recall
patterns we observe.
By definition recalling does not put any restrictions on the search costs of consumers who are
searching non-sequentially. To see this, define ck as the search cost of a consumer who is indifferent
between searching k and k + 1 times, i.e.,
ck = E[min
k
p]− E[min
k+1
p].
A consumer who finds it optimal to sample k firms should then search cost c such that ck < c < ck−1,
no matter whether the consumer recalls ore not. If we stick to that assumptions that consumers
have an uninformative prior with upper bound p and lower bound p, this equation simplifies to
ck =
p− p
k2 + 3k + 2
.
This means a consumer who finds it optimal to search twice should have search cost such that
c2 < c < c1, i.e.,
p− p
12
< c <
p− p
6
.
Note that because of the uniform prior we only need the upper and lower bound of the empirical
price distribution to derive the bounds on search costs that rationalize observed search patterns.
For instance, in the online bookstore example above, if the consumer were sampling two stores
non-sequentially instead of sequentially search cost should have been c ∈ (0.50, 1.00).
Figure 2(a) shows how the estimated search cost intervals for sequential search with Bayesian
updating and non-sequential search relate to each other for the online bookstore example. The
graph shows the gains from search as a function of the lowest observed price after having searched
once and twice. Notice that the number of searches is determined before the actual search starts
in the non-sequential search model, so there is no learning going on: the search cost range that
rationalizes behavior is therefore independent of the transaction price. In the sequential search
model with Bayesian updating the search cost and search cost range are increasing in the transaction
price.
Now let’s look how other search patterns can be rationalized by the sequential search model
with Bayesian updating. If a consumer searches just once search cost should be higher than the
13
(a) Searching twice and buying from first firm (b) Searching once
Figure 2: Gains from search as a function of the transaction (and lowest observed) price p∗N
gains from continued search, so
c > G(p∗N |p).
In the non-sequential search model search cost should be higher than the critical search cost value
c1, where c1 is again the search cost of a consumer who is indifferent between searching once and
twice. Figure 2(b) shows what range of search cost values rationalize searching once in both settings
for the online bookstore example. In both settings there is no upper bound on the search cost that
rationalizes searching once, which means that the two regions overlap for a large set of search
values.
Now suppose a consumer searches twice and buys from the second firm. While the non-
sequential search case is not different from a situation where the consumer buys from the first
firm, under sequential search with Bayesian updating the regions will change. If we only observe
the transaction price all we can say is
N
N + 1
G(p∗N |p) < c < G(p|p).
Figure 3(a) again shows the region of search cost that can rationalize behavior as a function of the
transaction price p∗N for both the sequential and non-sequential case. However, if we also observe
the first price p1, then
N
N + 1
G(p∗N |p) < c < G(p1|p).
Figure 3(b) plots the regions when the first price observed is p1 = 10. Note that by definition the
transaction price p∗N is lower than p1.
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(a) Searching twice and buying from second firm (only
transaction price p∗N observed)
(b) Searching twice and buying from second firm (both
prices observed, first price p1 = 10)
Figure 3: Gains from search as a function of the transaction (and lowest observed) price p∗N
To summarize, for consumers who search twice but buy from the first firm we can obtain pretty
precise estimates of their search costs, assuming they search sequentially with Bayesian updating.
In most other cases the region of search costs that rationalize observed behavior are going to be
much larger.
4 Testing the “no recall” hypothesis
The benchmark sequential search model of McCall tells us that the only instance that a consumer
will recall a store is if she exhausts the search by visiting all firms. If the consumer does not
exhaust the search, the optimal stopping rule is to buy from the last firm visited (i.e. price is below
reservation price).
To test this hypothesis, we have to check whether (i) a consumer recalled a product that was
previously sample, and (ii) if there was a recall, whether this was because the consumer exhausted
her search over all retailers she is aware of. To do this, we first identify all the stores that a consumer
is aware of by looking at previous visits to bookstores by that consumer. E.g., if we observe that
the consumer has only visited Amazon and BN in the past, this is a conservative lower bound on
the set of retailers that the consumer is aware of.
For a given transaction the consumer visits one store or the consumer searches more than one
store. If the consumer visits more than one store, she either buys from the last store, or she recalls
a previously visited store. In the case where the consumer visits one firm, we cannot distinguish
between sequential and non-sequential strategies.
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Table 4 shows the percentage of transactions for each of the three search sequences for different
definitions of the search period considered. The periods range from one week prior to the same day
of the transaction. For example, for the search period defined as the same day of the transaction
(bottom row of the table), in 90 percent of the transactions the consumer visited one firm in the
same day. In 10 percent of transactions, the consumers visited more than one bookstore. Among
the 10 percent of transactions in which a consumer visited more than one store, 62 percent bought
from the last firm sampled and 38 percent recalled a previously visited firm.
Search No. of visited If 2 or more firms, Exhausted
window visited bought from: search?
7 Days One 76%
2 or more 24% Last firm sampled 65%
Recalled 35% 55%
6 Days One 77%
2 or more 23% Last firm sampled 64%
Recalled 36% 55%
5 Days One 79%
2 or more 21% Last firm sampled 63%
Recalled 37% 55%
4 Days One 80%
2 or more 20% Last firm sampled 61%
Recalled 39% 55%
3 Days One 82%
2 or more 18% Last firm sampled 61%
Recalled 39% 56%
2 Days One 84%
2 or more 16% Last firm sampled 61%
Recalled 39% 56%
1 Day One 86%
2 or more 14% Last firm sampled 61%
Recalled 39% 56%
Same day One 90%
2 or more 10% Last firm sampled 62%
Recalled 38% 58%
Table 4: Test of “no recall” hypothesis
Note that there are a large number of instances where the consumer recalls a product that was
previously sampled. This may not immediately be construed as evidence against a sequential model,
however, as recall is allowed in a sequential search in which a consumer has exhausted the search
options available to her. The last column presents the percentange of the transactions where the
search were exhausted for each search sequence. Exhausting the search means that the consumer
searched all the firms they know (have visited before) at the time of the transaction. If we focus on
the bottom row of the table, where we look at search activity only on the day of the transaction, we
see that consumers “exhausted” the search possibilities in 58 percent of those transactions where
they recalled a previously sampled product. Perhaps, more to the point, consumers did not exhaust
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the search in 42% of the recalled instances, which is a violation of the basic sequential search model.
Note that our definition of “not exhausting a search” is a conservative one; it may have been the
case that the consumer was aware of more bookstores than we were able to capture with our data
set.
Search Window Total Amazon Barnes & Noble Book Clubs Other bookstores
Recall percentage by firm
7 Days 35% 50% 20% 18% 23%
6 Days 36% 51% 22% 20% 24%
5 Days 37% 52% 23% 23% 26%
4 Days 39% 54% 24% 27% 27%
3 Days 39% 54% 25% 28% 27%
2 Days 40% 54% 26% 28% 28%
1 Day 40% 54% 26% 31% 27%
Same Day 39% 53% 25% 30% 26%
Distribution of Recall Transactions
7 Days 1302 70% 18% 6% 6%
6 Days 1283 68% 20% 7% 6%
5 Days 1230 67% 20% 7% 6%
4 Days 1187 66% 20% 8% 6%
3 Days 1103 65% 21% 8% 7%
2 Days 994 64% 22% 7% 7%
1 Day 845 63% 22% 7% 7%
Same Day 588 64% 22% 6% 8%
Table 5: Recall by Firm
Table 5 looks in more detail at the recall transactions by linking recalls to the bookstores where
the final transaction took place. The table shows that in most cases searchers recalled to Amazon
and Barnes and Noble: only in 14% of the transactions in which consumers recalled a previously
visited firm on the same day of the transaction they recalled a book club or a bookstore from the
other bookstores category.12 Moreover, Table 5 also shows that Amazon.com visitors are much
more likely to recall than visitors of other bookstores: on the transaction day 53% of Amazon
buyers have recalled, while this is only between 25 and 30% for the other bookstores.
5 Estimates of search costs implied by sequential and non-sequential
search models
The results of the previous section rule out the basic sequential search model with a constant
reservation price strategy. However, as we argued above, once we allow for Bayesian updating,
the observation recall no longer invalidates sequential search. Thus we proceed with an alternative
12Note that some of the recall transactions in the book clubs and other bookstores categories might be to a different
bookstores within the same group. As Table 5 shows, given the small percentages this will not have a major impact
on our results.
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testing strategy in this section: we will estimate search cost bounds implied by both non-sequential
and the sequential with Bayesian updating models. Since this will yield multiple search cost bounds
for a given consumer in our data set, we will then check whether one model yields more consistent
search cost bounds across transactions for a given customer.
5.1 Bounds generated by the Rosenfield-Shapiro model
Recall from Section 3, that under the Rosenfield-Shapiro model, if we observe a consumer searching
twice, but buying from the first firm we know his search cost c should be bounded between:
N
N + 1
G(p∗N |p) < c < G(p∗N |p)
where, assuming a continuous uniform prior, the gains from search after having observed an initial
price p∗N are
G(p∗N = p) = p
∗
N −
(
p∗N − p
p− p ·
p∗N + p
2
+
p− p∗N
p− p · p
∗
N
)
=
p∗N − p
p− p ·
p∗N − p
2
.
To estimate the model we need N , the bounds of the price distribution p, p and the transaction
price. N is the number of firms known to each consumer at the time of the transaction. As before,
our empirical definition of when a consumer “knows” a store is if she has visited it prior to the
transaction within the span of the dataset.
To estimate the bounds of the price distribution, p, p, we use price data from comScore and
mySimon.com. The prices from comScore were the minimum and maximum transaction prices for
a given product within the entire span of the dataset. mySimon tracks 42 books during August and
September of 2004 (8 books were not bought in the entire 2002,2004 comScore data), we use the
minimum and maximum prices for this period. Since my simon provides stocking information, we
discard prices were the prices was not in stock, backorder, pre-order and other, or if it was flagged
as refurbished. We excluded Amazon Marketplace, which is reported by mySimon, since the prices
were likely to be for used books. For 80 percent of the books Amazon Marketplace was the lowest
price among all bookstores with prices as low as 1 cent to a dollar.
For people that searched and bought from one firm, we only observe the lower bound:
csl = G(p
∗
N |p).
Unfortunately, we can not calculate an upper bound for consumers who visited only one store.
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For searchers who visited more than one firm (recalled or bought from the last firm), the lower
bound of the search cost is
csl =
N
N + 1
G(p∗N |p).
The upper bound of the search cost for those who searched more than one firm and recalled is
csu = G(p
∗
N |p).
For people who searched more than one firm and bought from the last one, the upper bound on
the implied search cost is:
csu = G(p|p) = G(p∗N = p) =
p− p
2
.
5.2 Bounds generated by the non-sequential search model with uniform distri-
bution
For a non-sequential model with an uniform distribution, the cutoffs of the search cost are given
by
cnsk =
p− p
k2 + 3k + 2
.
where k is the number of firms searched. For a transaction the bounds are
cnsl =
p− p
k2 + 3k + 2
≤ c ≤ p− p
(k − 1)2 + 3 (k − 1) + 2 = c
ns
u .
We do not observe the upper bound for those who only visit one firm, k = 1.
5.3 Results
For each search session that ended in a purchase, we estimate the lower and, whenever possible,
upper bounds for both search strategies. Given an upper and lower bound on the search cost
implied by the data, we calculate the midpoint of the bounds as our point estimate of the search
cost.13
We then calculate the within consumer standard deviation of the “midpoint” search cost esti-
mates. Figure 4 displays the within-consumer standard deviation of search costs implied by the
sequential vs. non-sequential models (although the “midpoint” is a somewhat arbitrary summary
of the bounds, the figure does not change qualitatively if we plot the standard deviations of the
13Since neither model allows us to calculate an upper bound on the search cost when the consumer samples and
purchases from a single store, we omit these observations from our calculations.
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bounds separately). For both sequential and non-sequential search the sample consists of consumers
who recall a previously visited store, while not having visited all stores they are aware of.
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Figure 4: Dispersion of search costs
Observe that our estimates of search costs based on the non-sequential model display smaller
within-person dispersion than our estimates based on the sequential model, although the differences
are small. If we believe search costs to be relatively time invariant, the figure suggests that the
non-sequential model does a better job explaining our data with a parsimonious model of behavior.
6 Implications of the nonsequential search model
We will now investigate price elasticities and (static) profit-maximizing firm behavior in an envi-
ronment where consumers search non-sequentially. Based on the patterns we observed in our data,
we allow for unequal first sampling probabilities and marginal cost heterogeneity.
There are N firms selling a good j at a price pj . We will simplify matters by assuming consumers
observe the empirical cumulative distribution function of stores’ prices. This means consumers know
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which prices are around, but do not know which store is offering what prices. Furthermore, we
assume consumers obtain the first observation for free.
We assume consumers search non-sequentially and perfect recall, so consumers determine before
they start searching how many times to search. The first sampling probability is denoted ρj and
can be different across firms. For example, if Amazon has ρ = 0.65 this means 65% of consumers
start their search there. For simplicity, we assume all subsequent sampling probabilities are similar
across firms, i.e., conditional on searching twice, a consumer who has started searching at Amazon
is equally likely to go to Barnes and Noble as to 1bookstreet.
The assumption that consumers observe the empirical price distribution function allows us to
label the N stores by descending prices, p1 > · · · > pN , which means the lowest ranked firm (store
1) offers the worst deal in terms of prices, while the highest ranked firm (store N) is offering the
best deal. We can use this ordering to define αjk as the probability the j-lowest ranked firm offers
the lowest price out of k draws. To calculate αjk, we consider two different sampling protocols.
The first is sampling with replacement, which is in line with most of the search literature and the
models in the previous section. The second is sampling without replacement, which we believe is
more realistic given the setting.
Consider first the sampling with replacement case. Start with just one draw, i.e., k = 1. In this
case all what matters is the probability of being sampled first, which means αj1 = ρj . If k = 2 there
will be two firms in the sample, which means the store offering the highest overall price will only
offer the lowest price in the sample if it sampled twice, i.e., α12 = ρ1/N , where 1/N is the sampling
probability beyond the first search. The second-lowest ranked store will only offer the lowest price
when either this store is sampled twice or when it is sampled together with the lowest-ranked firm,
which means α22 = (ρ1 + 2ρ2)/N . Similarly, the probability the j-lowest ranked store will offer the
lowest price in the sample of two is αj2 = (ρ1 + . . . + ρj−1 + jρj)/N . More generally, as shown
in the Appendix, we can use combinatorics to derive the probability that the j-lowest ranked firm
offers the lowest price out of k = 3 random draws or more, i.e.,
αjk = ρj
(
j
N
)k−1
+ (ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1)
((
j
N
)k−1
−
(
j − 1
N
)k−1)
. (3)
Consider now the sampling without replacement case. A crucial difference with sampling with
replacement is that stores can only be sampled once. This means the j-lowest ranked firm will never
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be the one offering the lowest price in samples of size k > j. As before, with just one draw αj1 = ρj ,
but now the lowest ranked store will never offer the lowest price in a sample of two, i.e., α12 = 0.
The second-lowest ranked store will only offer the lowest price when either this store is sampled
first and the lowest ranked store second, which happens with probability ρ2/(N − 1), or the other
way around, which happens with probability ρ1/(N − 1). This means α22 = (ρ1 + ρ2)/(N − 1).
Similarly, the probability the j-lowest ranked store will offer the lowest price in the sample of two
is αj2 = (ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1 + (j − 1)ρj)/(N − 1). More generally, as shown in the Appendix, we can
use combinatorics to derive the probability that the j-lowest ranked firm offers the lowest price out
of k = 3 random draws or more, i.e.,
αjk =
{ (
(ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1)k−1j−1 + ρj
)
(j−1)×...×(j−(k−1))
(N−1)×...×(N−(k−1)) if j ≥ k;
0 if j < k.
(4)
Equations (3) or (4) can be used to characterize optimal consumer behavior as well the supply
side of the market. Consider first the consumer side of the market. Consumers are characterized
by a search cost value which is drawn from a search cost distribution G(c) with density function
g(c). The non-sequential search assumption allows us to define the critical search cost value ck as
the search cost of a consumer who is indifferent between searching k and k + 1 times, i.e.,
ck = E[min
k
p]− E[min
k+1
p].
Using probabilities αjk the expected minimum price when searching k times is
E[min
k
p] =
N∑
j=1
αjkpj ,
which means we can write the search cost cutoffs as
ck =
N∑
j=1
(αjk − αj(k+1))pj . (5)
Consumers with search costs between ck−1 and ck will search k times, so we can define µk as the
share of consumers searching k times, i.e.,
µ1 = 1−G(c1) for k = 1; (6a)
µk = G(ck−1)−G(ck) for k = 2, 3, . . . , N, (6b)
where G(cN ) = 0 by assumption.
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Next consider the supply side of the market. We can use the probabilities αjk defined in
equations (3) or (4) and the grouping of consumers µk given in equations (6a) and (6b) to calculate
the market shares, i.e., the market share equation for store j is just the sum of the probability of
selling to the different groups of consumers, multiplied by their shares in the consumer population:
qj =
N∑
k=1
αjkµk. (7)
Store j’s profits are given by
Πj = Sqj(pj −mcj),
where S is the size of the market and mcj is firm j’s marginal cost. Firms’ static profit maximizing
behavior implies the first-order condition for pj should hold, i.e.,
qj + (pj −mcj)∂qj
∂pj
= 0. (8)
In the Appendix we show the derivatives of the market share equations (7) are
∂qj
∂pj
= −
N−1∑
k=1
(αjk − αj(k+1))2g(ck). (9)
6.1 Estimation
We observe sampling probabilities and prices, so we can directly calculate the ck’s defined in
equation (5). We also observe µk, the shares of consumers searching k times, from which we can
calculate G(ck) for k = 1, 2, . . . , N using equations (6a) and (6b). Combining the two gives a non-
parametric estimate of the search cost cumulative distribution function (see also De los Santos,
2008).
From observed sampling probabilities ρj and the share of consumers searching k times µk we can
get an estimate of the market shares by using equation (7). Equation (9) can be used to estimate
the derivates of the market shares. However, the search cost PDF evaluated at the cutoffs are not
observed, so we proceed by using the trapezoid method (see also Hortac¸su and Syverson, 2004) to
derive an approximation, i.e.,
g(ck−1) + g(ck) =
2[G(ck−1)−G(ck)]
ck−1 − ck =
2µk
ck−1 − ck .
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Notice that in this case g(c0) is not identified, so we set it equal to zero. The estimates of g(ck)
allow us to calculate marginal cost as
mcj = pj +
qj
∂qj/∂pj
. (10)
7 Application: price elasticities and markups of online bookstores
In this section, we present estimates price elasticities and markups of the online bookstores that
appear in our sample using the model developed in the previous section. To estimate the model, we
use our data set on search behavior completed with prices from the mySimon.com price database.14
For four books that appear in the mySimon.com price database we have a sufficient number of
transactions, so we focus on these books only. These books all have appeared on the New York
Times Bestseller list for at least some period in 2004.
Prices ($) Consumers by
Sample Size (%)
Product name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max µ1 µ2 µ3
The Da Vinci Code 48 14.48 0.49 13.91 14.97 0.751 0.227 0.022
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 24 11.70 0.28 11.34 11.97 0.756 0.244 0.000
The Rule of Four 17 14.60 1.55 11.97 15.88 0.846 0.154 0.000
R is for Ricochet 23 16.64 2.12 13.07 18.45 0.802 0.161 0.036
Notes:
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 gives descriptive statistics for the four books. Mean prices are similar across books,
with The Five People you Meet in Heaven being a bit lower priced on average than the other books,
while R is for Ricochet is priced a bit higher. The reported shares of consumers sampling k stores
shows little variation across the books. In line with findings for the complete sample, consumers
search activity is very modest: between 75% and 85% of consumers visits at most one bookstore
before buying and only for two of the books consumers search more than twice.
Table 7 gives the estimated cutoff values of the search cost distributions that rationalize ob-
served search patterns for the case of homogenous goods. These cutoff search costs are estimated
using equation (5). We report our findings for sampling with replacement as well sampling without
replacement. We allow for asymmetric first sampling probabilities – the probability a bookstore
14Book clubs did not appear on mySimon.com during the sampling period, so for this category we use weighted
median transaction prices.
24
Cutoff search costs CDF values PDF values
Product name c1 c2 c3 G(c1) G(c2) G(c3) g(c1) g(c2) g(c3)
Sampling with replacement
The Da Vinci Code 0.404 0.213 0.115 0.249 0.022 0.000 1.939 0.440 0.000
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 0.228 0.125 0.071 0.244 0.000 0.000 4.734 0.000 0.000
The Rule of Four 0.931 0.629 0.442 0.154 0.000 0.000 1.021 0.000 0.000
R is for Ricochet 1.355 0.888 0.608 0.198 0.036 0.000 0.431 0.259 0.000
Sampling without replacement
The Da Vinci Code 0.539 0.300 0.060 0.249 0.022 0.000 1.716 0.181 0.000
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 0.304 0.182 0.059 0.244 0.000 0.000 3.979 0.000 0.000
The Rule of Four 1.241 1.056 0.930 0.154 0.000 0.000 1.662 0.000 0.000
R is for Ricochet 1.807 1.464 1.194 0.198 0.036 0.000 0.672 0.268 0.000
Notes:
Table 7: Empirical Non-Sequential Search Cost CDF
is sampled first is estimated using all transactions in the database.15 Also reported are the corre-
sponding quantiles of the search cost distribution which are calculated using G(ck) = 1−
∑k
i=1 µi.
As explained in the previous section, given estimates of cutoff search costs ck and corresponding
CDF quantiles G(ck) we can calculate the values of the search cost PDF evaluated at the cutoff
search costs using the trapezoid method. Estimated PDF values are displayed in the last three
columns of Table 7.
Marginal Costs mc ($) Elasticities E
Product name Amazon B&N Book clubs Other Amazon B&N Book clubs Other
Sampling with replacement
The Da Vinci Code 11.72 10.48 12.50 12.50 -4.61 -3.34 -9.90 -8.75
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 10.52 10.09 10.65 10.86 -8.24 -6.36 -13.12 -23.43
The Rule of Four 8.47 6.44 9.44 12.47 -2.20 -1.68 -4.73 -5.82
R is for Ricochet 4.76 -2.13 8.05 10.46 -1.36 -0.90 -2.60 -2.59
Sampling without replacement
The Da Vinci Code 12.94 12.29 12.87 12.95 -7.38 -5.58 -13.41 -12.13
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 11.05 10.80 10.88 10.97 -12.82 -10.27 -17.72 -30.38
The Rule of Four 13.14 12.76 11.02 14.08 -6.54 -5.09 -12.58 -15.30
R is for Ricochet 13.33 11.13 11.10 14.37 -3.85 -2.52 -6.65 -6.40
Notes:
Table 8: Supply side estimates: marginal costs and elasticities
To derive marginal costs we use equation (10). We replace store j’s markets share qj and own-
price derivative ∂qj/∂pj by equations (7) and (9). What is left is an expression which only depends
on search cost CDF and PDF values evaluated at the cutoff search costs as well as sampling
probabilities, all of which have been reported above. Table 8 displays marginal costs for each
bookstore-book combination as well as implied elasticities for both sampling assumptions. Table 9
15Amazon is sampled first in the majority of transactions (67%), followed by Barnes and Noble (16%), Book clubs
(10%), and Other bookstores (7%).
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gives markups (as a multiplier of marginal costs) and profit margins (in dollars) using the estimated
elasticities reported in Table 8.
Markups Profit margins ($)
Product name Amazon B&N Book clubs Other Amazon B&N Book clubs Other
Sampling with replacement
The Da Vinci Code 1.277 1.428 1.112 1.129 3.248 4.486 1.406 1.612
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 1.138 1.186 1.083 1.045 1.453 1.881 0.879 0.484
The Rule of Four 1.831 1.267 1.268 1.207 7.039 9.444 2.532 2.587
R is for Ricochet 3.783 -8.670 1.624 1.628 13.242 20.578 5.018 6.569
Sampling without replacement
The Da Vinci Code 1.157 1.218 1.081 1.090 2.028 2.684 1.037 1.163
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 1.085 1.108 1.060 1.034 0.934 1.165 0.651 0.373
The Rule of Four 1.181 1.245 1.086 1.070 2.372 3.120 0.952 0.984
R is for Ricochet 1.351 1.658 1.177 1.185 4.674 7.320 1.963 2.660
Notes:
Table 9: Supply side estimates: markups and margins
To derive marginal costs we use equation (10). We replace store j’s markets share qj and own-
price derivative ∂qj/∂pj by equations (7) and (9). What is left is an expression which only depends
on search cost CDF and PDF values evaluated at the cutoff search costs as well as sampling
probabilities, all of which have been reported above. Table 8 displays marginal costs for each
bookstore-book combination as well as implied elasticities for both sampling assumptions. Table 9
gives markups (as a multiplier of marginal costs) and profit margins (in dollars) using the estimated
elasticities reported in Table 8. Table 10 shows the empirically observed market shares together
with the market shares estimated using equation (7).
Amazon B&N Book clubs Other
Product name obs. est. obs. est. obs. est. obs. est.
Sampling with replacement
The Da Vinci Code 0.417 0.595 0.188 0.132 0.312 0.157 0.083 0.116
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 0.625 0.600 0.208 0.133 0.167 0.142 0.000 0.124
The Rule of Four 0.529 0.627 0.176 0.144 0.294 0.132 0.000 0.097
R is for Ricochet 0.348 0.607 0.130 0.138 0.522 0.148 0.000 0.107
Sampling without replacement
The Da Vinci Code 0.417 0.568 0.188 0.123 0.312 0.178 0.083 0.131
The Five People you Meet in Heaven 0.625 0.576 0.208 0.123 0.167 0.157 0.000 0.143
The Rule of Four 0.529 0.612 0.176 0.138 0.294 0.143 0.000 0.107
R is for Ricochet 0.348 0.584 0.130 0.131 0.522 0.167 0.000 0.117
Notes:
Table 10: Observed and estimated market shares
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7.1 Discussion
Our results on price elasticities and markups appear to depend on the sampling protocol (with
replacement or without replacement). In general, we get much higher price elasticities, and lower
markups for Amazon and Barnes and Noble from the model with sampling without replacement.
This is perhaps intuitively clear – if sampling is with replacement, Amazon has higher market
power in that the consumer will possibly sample it multiple times during her search. In future
work, we will test whether actual searches satisfy the with or without replacement search protocol
better. Obviously, product recall is a feature of non-sequential search, hence observing recall does
not eliminate sampling without replacement. However, under sampling without replacement, we
should not observe a consumer revisit more than one store a second time. A priori, however, we
believe sampling without replacement is likely to be the more appropriate choice for this setting.
Our price elasticities also provide an interesting comparison with the results of Chevalier and
Goolsbee (2003), who found own an own price elasticity of −3.5 for Barnes and Noble and −0.45 for
Amazon, using the very different methodology of investigating the effect of price changes on sales
ranks of books. Our estimated own price elasticity for Amazon are mostly a lot higher (between
−1.3 and −12.8 across books and sampling protocols), and somewhat higher for Barnes and Noble
(between −0.9 and −6.8). The difference between our findings may be due to several factors: first,
Chevalier and Goolsbee’s estimates are based on a much larger sample of books; our sample is
restricted to four best-sellers. It is plausible that consumers are more price elastic when purchasing
best-sellers (which could be utilized as “loss-leaders” by bookstores to attract new customers).
Second, Chevalier and Goolsbee’s results are based on 2001 data; whereas ours is based on 2004
data. It is possible that online bookshoppers in 2004 have gotten somewhat savvier at searching
for deals than they were 2001. Third, our methodologies are quite different: while Chevalier and
Goolsbee have the advantage of being able to utilize exogenous price shocks, but are limited by
lack of sales/quantity data (and have to extrapolate using a Pareto distribution), our method relies
crucially on the specification of our demand model. We hope that further research can identify
data sets that can overcome the limitations of these two approaches.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated to what extent consumers are indeed using the sequential and
non-sequential search strategies put forth by the large theoretical literature on search behavior.
By using detailed data on the browsing and purchasing behavior of a large panel of consumers, we
have tested various restrictions classical search models put on search behavior. We have shown that
the benchmark model of sequential search, where it is assumed consumers know the distribution
of prices to sample from, can be rejected based on the recall patterns observed in the data, even if
there is a finite number of firms. However, if consumers do not know the distributions from which
prices are drawn but instead learn the price distributions using Bayesian updating, recall patterns
no longer reject the sequential protocol. Instead, we have looked in more detail at patterns in the
search costs that rationalize observed search behavior for given consumers over time, and shown
using several tests that a non-sequential search model does a better job in explaining those patterns
than a sequential search model with Bayesian updating.
Our finding that the non-sequential search protocol outperforms the sequential search model
in terms of explaining observed search behavior for the subjects in our sample is to some extent
surprising given that non-sequential search protocol is often thought of as a constrained version of
sequential search. However, as shown by Morgan and Manning (1985) the optimal search model
allows consumers to choose both the size of the sample and how many samples to take and as such
encompasses both the sequential and non-sequential search protocol. When there is a large time
lag between making the search decision and obtaining the actual quotation non-sequential search
is typically optimal, because it allows the searcher to gather information quicker than would have
been possible with sequential search.
Although a typical online shopper will not face large time lags when searching, a non-sequential
search strategy might still be a good approximation of the optimal strategy if there exist economies
of scale to sampling or if the searcher discounts the future. As argued by Manning and Morgan
(1982), sufficiently large economies of scale to sampling will make it optimal to sample more firms at
once and stop afterwards, even if the consumer can continue sampling. Indeed, after one has gone
through the hassle of finding the right book and obtaining a price quote at one online bookstore,
simple copying and pasting the ISBN number to the website of another bookstore is enough to
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obtain an additional price quotation. Some preliminary evidence on whether this is indeed what is
going on is presented in Figure 5(a), where we have plotted kernel density plots of the durations
of the first and second search for searches on the same day and previous day of the transaction,
conditional on searching more than once. As the graphs shows, searchers spend much less time
during their second search. Figure 5(b) shows that this is not driven by the differences in the
bookstores.
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Figure 5: Duration Searches
Finally, we have explored the quantitative implications of our favored model, with non-sequential
search, by estimating the price elasticities implied by the non-sequential search model, and the
associated markups. Our findings indicate higher price elasticities than found in Chevalier and
Goolsbee (2003), though in Section 7.1, we discuss several factors that may explain the differences
in results. We hope that this exercise demonstrates the usefulness of the consumer search model
as a “demand-side” model that could be applied in settings where consumer search is deemed an
important factor.
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APPENDIX
A: Probabilities of offering the lowest price
First consider sampling with replacement. With probability ρj the j-lowest ranked store is sampled
first. With probability (j/N)k−1 all remaining k − 1 draws do not belong to stores offering lower
prices than store j, so the probability of offering the lowest price out of k draws when being
sampled first is ρj(j/N)k−1. With probability ρ1 + . . . + ρj−1 a lower ranked store is sampled
in first. In this case store j should at least be sampled once in the remaining draws. With
probability (j/N)k−1 no stores offering lower prices than store j will be drawn in the remaining
draws. This probability includes combinations of stores that do not involve store j, i.e., with
probability (j−1)k−1/Nk−1 all k−1 draws will be stores offering lower utility than store j. Taking
the difference gives the probability store j offers the lowest price among the remaining stores, i.e,
this probability is (j/N)k−1 − ((j − 1)/N)k−1. Therefore, the probability of offering the lowest
price out of k draws when not being sampled first is (ρ1 + . . .+ρj−1)
(
(j/N)k−1 − ((j − 1)/N)k−1).
Taken together, the probability the j-lowest ranked firm offers the lowest price out of k = 3 random
draws or more, is
αjk = ρj
(
j
N
)k−1
+ (ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1)
((
j
N
)k−1
−
(
j − 1
N
)k−1)
.
Next consider sampling without replacement. When sampling k times, k firms need to be picked
out of N firms. With probability ρj the j-lowest ranked firm is the starting point. Out of the
remaining N − 1 firms, k − 1 firms need to be picked, which all have to offer a higher price than
firm j in order for firm j to offer the lowest price. There are j − 1 such stores, so the probability
that store j sells conditional on being the first sampled can be calculated using the hypergeometric
distribution, i.e., this probability is
(
j−1
k−1
)
/
(
N−1
k−1
)
. With probability ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1 one of the other
stores is the starting point for the consumer. In that case store j has to be sampled in one of the
remaining searches, which is proportional to k − 1. The remaining k − 2 stores sampled need to
offer higher prices; to calculate this probability we can again use the hypergeometric distribution,
i.e., the probability is
(
j−2
k−2
)
/
(
N−2
k−2
)
. All together, the probability the j-lowest ranked firm offers
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the lowest price out of k = 3 random draws or more, where j ≥ k, is
αjk = ρj
(
j−1
k−1
)(
N−1
k−1
) + (ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1) k − 1
N − 1
(
j−2
k−2
)(
N−2
k−2
) ;
= ρj
(N − k)!(j − 1)!
(j − k)!(N − 1)! + (ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1)
k − 1
N − 1
(N − k)!(j − 2)!
(j − k)!(N − 2)! ;
=
(
(ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1)
k − 1
j − 1 + ρj
)
(N − k)!(j − 1)!
(j − k)!(N − 1)! ;
=
(
(ρ1 + . . .+ ρj−1)
k − 1
j − 1 + ρj
)
(j − 1)× . . .× (j − (k − 1))
(N − 1)× . . .× (N − (k − 1)) .
When j < k store j will never offer the lowest price, so αjk = 0 if j < k.
B: Derivatives of Demand Curves
Using equations (6a) and (6b), first rewrite the market share equation (7) as
qj = αj1 −
N−1∑
k=1
(αjk − αj(k+1))G(ck).
Taking the price derivative gives
dqj
dpj
= −
N−1∑
k=1
(αjk) − αj(k+1))g(ck)
dck
dpj
(A11)
The derivative of ck with respect to pj is
dck
dpj
= αjk − αj(k+1).
Plugging this in equation (A11) gives
∂qj
∂pj
= −
N−1∑
k=1
(αjk − αj(k+1))2g(ck).
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